The Hidden Secrets of Money

With over 3 million YouTube views, The Hidden Secrets of Money by economist Mike Maloney is a video series that I highly recommend to you, your family and friends. Debi and I just finished Episode 9 and she said, everyone needs to watch this. So please watch it and spread it all over the world because even though it focuses on the U.S. and our monetary system, it is applicable to every country in the world.



Like many people, this author is full of himself, surely thinkings he is an intellectual with great skills in logic. He is a good author but left me asking numerous unanswered questions. His name is David Mikics and is also a prolific author on mainly the topic of Jews and Judaism. This is why it is worth reading. As you will understand from their own words, they are and have been highly involved in “revolutionizing” the world for their perceived well being under the guise of God’s will. By reading the comments, as amusing as the article, you will find they are “know it alls” that agree on little, relying on religion to give them the truth, rather than logic and wisdom and even disagreeing on much of that.

Religion surely plays an essential role in our world and it provides us great things and achievements but thinking it is impervious to imperfections or even downright evil at times, as the Roman Catholic Priests and other religious groups have shown us, is a fool’s errand.

At 15, sitting in the public library in suburban Atlanta, I eagerly drank in every word of Isaac Deutscher’s monumental three-volume biography of Leon Trotsky. Glossing over Trotsky’s ruthlessness, Deutscher extolled instead his unmatched courage and humane feeling for the masses. A few years later, back in the Northeast for college at NYU, I kibitzed with the Sparticists who hawked their crude newspaper outside Bobst Library. It was 1979, close to the tail end of the old Radical Left, when the Rosenbergs were still innocent. My college girlfriend was a red-diaper baby, the daughter of communists. Soon I learned all there was to know about the battles between Alcove One (Trotskyist) and Alcove Two (Stalinist) at the CCNY cafeteria in the 1930s. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were my favorite power couple. I got a work-study job at the People’s Coffee Counter at NYU Law School and even invented its motto: “You have nothing to lose but your change.”

In short, I was a teenage Red. I was no idiot: I didn’t believe a revolution was coming to the shores of America. But I basked nostalgically in what I foolishly thought was the glorious past of Trotskyite Bolshevism.

It took only a few more years before I became disillusioned with the radical slogans. Maybe it was Jesse Jackson announcing at a rally in the early 1980s that he had been to Cuba and knew that it was a true democracy. Or Edward Said, whose hostility to Israel troubled me, writing that the Marxist state of South Yemen was a model for the Middle East. But I also learned something else about Trotsky: During the Bolsheviks’ war on the peasantry, he was responsible for the deaths of millions of human beings. In the end, that was all that mattered.

Thoughts of my youthful enthusiasm for Marxism came back to me recently after seeing the U.K. Telegraph headline “I Want to Save the Capitalism my Father Hated.” The story concerned the clean-cut, rapidly rising Ed Miliband, who won the struggle with his brother David to become the head of Britain’s Labour Party and who might well become the country’s first Jewish Prime Minister since Disraeli. The brothers’ father, Ralph Miliband, was a renowned Marxist and Jewish refugee from the Nazis; he is buried a stone’s throw from Karl Marx in London’s Highgate Cemetery. Ed Miliband practices a mellower approach to capitalism. “The free market working properly” was Miliband’s version of what is to be done in his interview with the Telegraph. But, Miliband added, socialism will never die: It is “a tale that never ends.”

Miliband’s wish to cling to the vestiges of Marxism even as he extolls the free market is not unusual in our recession-plagued moment. Nicolas Sarkozy had himself been photographed reading Capital in the aftermath of the crash, and countless professors in the humanities and social sciences (though not, of course, countless economists) fly their Marxist colors proudly, even if they would never dream of abolishing private ownership or markets. In the rarified world of academic jargon, Marxism plays its role in an intellectual picnic that includes poststructuralist thinkers of every stripe. Being a classroom Marxist means talking about the uncanny character of the commodity form or the phantomlike digital age, tossing in a few scattered lines from Badiou and Žižek, and suggesting that our recent, world-shaking financial crisis proves the “relevance” of Marx—without explaining what makes Marx’s outdated economic theories and their accompanying intellectual apparatus relevant to the tremors of 21st-century capitalism. We might do better, instead, to begin at the beginning.


While anti-communist socialists far outnumbered communists among American Jews in the first half of the 20th century, it is also true that Jews embraced communism like no other ethnic or religious group in the country. The CUNY political scientist Jack Jacobs, who is editing a volume for Cambridge University Press based on last year’s YIVO conference on Jews and the Left, told me, “After the war, in 1949, the American Communist Party”—which probably numbered less than 50,000 members—“may have been as much as 50 percent Jewish.” What better way is there to understand the appeal of radical politics for Jews than to go back to the original Jewish leftist, Karl Marx? In an impressive new biography, the historian Jonathan Sperber focuses on Marx as a 19th-century thinker, a man of his time and place; and one of Sperber’s concerns is necessarily Marx’s Jewishness.

Strictly speaking, of course, Marx was not a Jew: His parents were converts to Protestantism, and he declared his atheism from an early age. In the infamous essay he wrote when he was 25, “On the Jewish Question,” Marx declared that society must be freed from Judaism, which he identified with capitalism: a huckstering entrepreneurial worship of the false god, money. At the same time, Marx advocated that Jews be granted civil rights—so that they could then be divested of their Jewishness and become fully assimilated. Marx’s letters are strewn with derogatory references to Jews; though Sperber tries to make the case that Marx “took a certain perverse pride” in his Jewish ancestry, he can’t muster much supporting evidence. What we see instead are a series of slurs that today would certainly be called anti-Semitic.

Sperber provides an affecting portrait of Marx the man, who was a devoted and enthusiastic father: With one of his daughters on his shoulders, he would play “cavalry” on Hampstead Heath, running to and fro. He was devastated for years by the death of his son Edgar at age 8. But Marx’s habits as polemicist and political organizer have decidedly less appeal. His writing style was a calamity: full of sometimes puerile vehemence, he heaped scorn on his opponents, inaugurating the long Marxist tradition of mercilessly deriding anyone with incorrect opinions. Marx displayed particular contempt for the high-living, dandyish Ferdinand Lassalle, a fellow socialist also of Jewish origin. In a letter to Engels, Marx mocked Lassalle, who supposedly had African ancestry, as a repulsive “combination of Jewry and Germanism with the negroid basic substance”; “the pushiness of this lad is also nigger-like,” he added. In Marx’s pamphlets, mudslinging abounds: His opponents are generally idiots, traitors, and scoundrels, but these heavy-handed insults tend to make us doubt Marx himself, since he relies so much on vituperation instead of reasoned argument.

Marx failed as a theorist too. As Sperber argues, Marx’s effort to derive the market price of goods from their value, the labor that went into them, was a vestige of the 19th-century economic theories of David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill (both of them arch-capitalists). By the time Marx died, economists had already given up trying to relate price to value and were beginning to understand that value was a chimera. With the growing dominance of technology, it had become impossible to locate value in the time required to produce goods, as Marx, following Ricardo and Mill, had tried to do. Machines can make products incredibly fast; but these products aren’t worth any less than if workers had spent days toiling at them, as Marx’s theory suggests.

Finally, Marx was a failure as a prophet, in spite of the fact that he inspired revolutions that changed the course of history. His essential idea, influenced by Ricardo, was that capitalism would become less and less profitable and that its downward spiral toward the abyss of deflation—lower prices, lower profits—would be followed by worldwide revolution. Instead, capitalism has become vastly more profitable.

It’s important to remember that American communism was hardly a classroom sport. Like today’s al-Qaida agents, communists were sworn to overthrow the government on behalf of a foreign enemy in order to usher in a millennial moment of radical social transformation. Yet memories of Jewish communism in America usually come wrapped in the warm, rosy glow of the good old days, when passionate solidarity reigned. In The Romance of American Communism, Vivian Gornick interviewed a hundred veterans of the party, many of them Jews. She quotes Sarah Gordon, who describes communist politics as “rich, warm, energetic, an exciting thickness in which our lives were wrapped. … in us and in all like us lay the exciting, changing world.” “The Party was everything,” garment worker Ben Saltzman told Gornick. “If I died I would have willed everything I had to the Party. I would have left my wife if necessary.” One hears the hard edge of fanaticism in such statements, combined with the softness of a towering naïveté, the sentimental and dangerous belief that if one wills something like the greatness of the Soviet Union to be true, then it must be true. Gornick discounts the insidiousness of all of this, intent on seeing only good will and suffering in the impoverished, aging men and women she interviewed. Suffer they did, but they were nevertheless blind.

American communists did some good, particularly when they fought for racial justice. But they did much more bad: David Greenglass and the Rosenbergs helped bring the world close to atomic Armageddon and gave the Soviet Union, as a nuclear-armed power, the might to subject millions to its tyranny. It’s hard to reconcile the Rosenbergs’ treacherous deeds with the tributes to comradeship and humanity that Gornick gleaned from her interviews. A large majority of Jews chose socialism or liberalism over communism, and they ought to be praised for the suspicion that is a necessary part of democratic responsibility, their refusal to give in to Soviet propaganda. Sperber, for his part, is unable to explain why Marx was so appealing to Lenin and Trotsky, Stalin and Mao—and why his ideas became the basis for a terrifying new social order.


In his biography of Marx, Isaiah Berlin singled out one of this radical thinker’s central ideas: that the inner convictions we take to be the ground of moral and religious truth are in fact illusions, myths that need to be demolished so that humanity can be freed from its chains. Our beliefs about right and wrong cannot be taken at face value, Marx argued, because we have been duped into them by our historical circumstances. So, Marx in his March 1850 Address to the Communist League exhorted his followers to “force the democrats to carry out their current terrorist phrases.” Speaking of “so-called excesses” like “the people’s revenge on hated individuals,” he proclaimed that the workers “must not just tolerate such excesses but take over the leadership of them.”

Berlin emphasized an aspect of Marx that Sperber largely overlooks: his endorsement of revolutionary violence as a way to push history forward. In Marx’s view, history is an inexorable process that cannot be resisted or denied; but it also must be helped along. In its full-fledged version, the Marxist dialectic is a powerful intellectual toolkit for justifying oppression, since whatever the party leaders decide to do expresses the will of history itself.For communist Jews, being Red was a way of asserting their radical difference, rather than their right to belong in American society.

It is striking that popular culture and the universities alike are fixated on Jewish communism instead of Jewish socialism, reversing the actual historical record, in which socialists early on triumphed over their communist rivals. New York’s most influential Yiddish daily, the Forward, was at the heart of the storm. “At the very beginning the Forward was reluctant to criticize the Soviet government, even though they were at war with the local Communists in New York,” commented historian Daniel Soyer, co-author of The Emerging Metropolis: New York Jews in the Age of Immigration, in an interview. “They saw the Red Army and the Soviets as a bulwark against anti-Semitism.” But by 1922 the split between the socialist Forward and the Communist Party was complete. Jewish communists even tried, without success, to prevent Abraham Cahan, the Forward’s anti-Bolshevist editor, from being allowed to visit the Soviet Union in 1927. A Russian Yiddish paper, Emes, lambasted the Forward as a “strikebreaking daily”: They called Cahan’s paper a brothel with a mezuzah on its door, the mezuzah being its hollow professions of leftist faith. “One thing Cahan said was that the Soviets had gotten it backwards,” Soyer remarked to me. “Socialism was supposed to abolish poverty, but the Russians had abolished wealth instead.”

As the ’20s went on, the prestige of the communist movement declined drastically among American Jews. “In 1929 the Communists just looked ridiculous,” Tony Michels, author of A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York, told me in an interview, “when they first condemned the Arab riots in Palestine, and then basically supported them, all on orders from Moscow. They were thoroughly discredited, and there was so much hostility to the Communists, it almost put the Communist paper, the Frayhayt, out of business.”

During the Popular Front period of the 1930s, the Communist Party USA famously adopted as its slogan “Communism is twentieth-century Americanism.” But for communist Jews, being Red was a way of asserting their radical difference, rather than their right to belong in American society. The party card they carried signaled their disagreement with American racism and American conformity, with the white picket fences that excluded the downtrodden, the ethnic others. Tragically, such a statement of protest meant loyalty to a totalitarian foreign power and to a leadership that manipulated and abused them as a matter of course.

In the 21st century, with communism long dead, Jews still want to express their difference from mainstream America. But they rarely choose revolutionary politics as their means of expression. Instead, religious observance, commitment to Israel, and work for social justice are the main ways that Jews proclaim their identity. Rather than looking backward with yearning toward a true Red past, Jews should rejoice that most of us were free from the illusion that warped so many minds and lives and that America was spared what so many other countries had to endure: the coming to pass of Marx’s vision.

Curing inequity; a reality or illusion

The push to cure social inequities has been going on for thousands of years. Slavery was practiced on just about every continent including castration as a means to quell any rebellion. Females have always been much easier to enslave as most women are weaker than most men but they have fought back with other weapons such as poisons and seduction.

How and what have we as human beings done to alter this. We have had to hold knives to King’s throats, hang them, overthrow their armies, pirate their ships and face the hangman’s noose, the guillotine, being staked to flames of fire, more recently the firing squad and unimaginable types of torture when they failed. Our founding fathers took great risks to overthrow their governments and the American, French and British revolutions triggered others around the world to revolt against their governments.

Now we are acquiescing our rights for the alleged public good and a couple of centuries of liberty and greater equity are being reversed. Are we still being misled into believing democracy will cure human inequities?

I have not read this book, but it is surely one of great interest.

The Great Leveler;
Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century

Lawlessness vs The Law

Larkin Rose explains, what some define as anarchy; without government, how it would work and why a civil society does not require a politically determined government.

Thinking that people will not defend themselves and their property, no matter what laws have been enacted, appears to escape those who claim governments police powers are a necessity in a civil society. The Police spend 98% of their time investigating criminal actions, not stopping them from occurring in the first place. Laws are simply typed words in books on shelves that honest people do not need and criminal ignore.

Are Judges Bound by the Law or What is Just

For those of you who do not know of Lysander Spooner, he was one of the most outspoken abolitionists and thinkers of his day. This is a discussion on one of the many debates Spooner was involved with on our Constitution.

by George H. Smith Facebook

Smith details the scholarly debate between Lysander Spooner and Wendell Phillips over the constitutionality of slavery.

In 1845 Lysander Spooner published The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. Two years later Wendell Phillips, who believed that the Constitution is a proslavery document, responded with a critique in the Anti-Slavery Standard,and shortly afterwards he republished his criticisms, with some additions, as a book, Review of Lysander Spooner’s Essay on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery(1847). Spooner then responded to many of Phillips’s arguments in Part Second of The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (1847).

Perhaps the most interesting practical disagreement between Spooner and Phillips concerned the issue of what antislavery judges should do when required by their oath of office to enforce unjust laws supporting slavery. Most abolitionists, including Phillips, believed that judges should resign in these cases, whereas Spooner argued that judges should not resign but should, in effect, nullify proslavery laws by rendering just decisions regardless of what the law may say. This essay explains some features of this fascinating debate.

Wendell Phillips wrote:

All that we have to do, as Abolitionists, with Mr. Spooner’s argument is to consider its influence on the Anti-Slavery cause. He maintains that the Judges of the United States Courts have the right to declare Slavery illegal, and he proposes that they should be made to do so. We believe that, in part, he mistakes fancy for argument; in part, he bases his conclusions on a forced interpretation of legal maxims, and that the rest of his reasoning, where not logically absurd and self-contradictory, is subversive of all sound principles of Government and of public faith. Any movement or party, therefore, founded on his plan, would, as soon as it grew considerable enough to attract public attention, be met by the contempt and disapprobation of every enlightened and honest man. To trust our cause with such a leader is to insure its shipwreck. To keep, therefore, so far as our influence extends, the Anti-Slavery movement in its legitimate channel, to base it on such principles as shall deserve and command the assent of every candid man, to hold up constantly before the nation the mirror of its own deformity, we undertake the distasteful task of proving the Constitution hostile to us and the slave.

Phillips believed that previous abolitionists who had defended the unconstitutionality of slavery were often guilty of rationalizing. They began with the conclusion that voting and other political activities were essential to the antislavery cause, and to justify this political strategy they had to show that the U.S. Constitution, properly understood, is antislavery. This generated forced and unconvincing arguments manufactured for a good cause. But Spooner differed from his predecessors.

It is but justice to Mr. Spooner to acknowledge that his performance differs from most of those which have preceded it, not only in the ingenuity of the argument, but in the honest aim of the writer. With him “the wish” does not appear to have been “father to the thought.” He did not first found a party [i.e., the abolitionist Liberty Party] and then stretch out both hands to clutch something that would sustain him in the right of voting at all. He did not violate his own convictions, and then, obstinately shutting his eyes, cry out, “I do not see where I am inconsistent.” His logic does not grow out of a lingering love of the ballot, or a secret desire to put “non-resistance hors du combat.” He did not, in order to save a corrupt and trembling Church and shield it from the storm of deserved rebuke, endeavor to build an ark of political refuge out of legal scraps and disjointed and misunderstood quotations. He seems to have persuaded himself of the truth of his own theory, and then to have thrown it fearlessly out to the world, trusting in its truth to make it useful, and with no ulterior object or private end to serve.

Let us suppose that Spooner was correct—that the U.S. Constitution, properly interpreted, is truly antislavery. To this supposition Phillips responded with some interesting points.

We go on to ask (of Abolitionists, not of Mr. Spooner,) how comes it that, as he all along confesses, Courts, Congress, and the people have uniformly warped and twisted the whole instrument aside and awry to serve and sustain Slavery? That the whole Administration of the Government, from its very commencement, has been pro-slavery? If the Constitution be guiltless of any blame in this matter, then surely there must be some powerful element at work in the Union itself, which renders it impossible for this to be an Anti-Slavery nation, even when blessed with an Anti-Slavery Constitution; and thus the experience of fifty years proves Union under any form, to be impossible without guilt. In such circumstances, no matter what the Constitution is, whether good or bad, it is the duty of every honest man to join in the war-cry of the American Anti-Slavery Society, “no Union with Slaveholders.” For if we could not escape the infamy and the sin of such a pro-slavery administration as ours has always been, under a Constitution pure as Mr. Spooner describes this to be, then, as we never can have a better, we ought to give up the experiment.

Phillips attempted to score an easy victory here for the Garrisonian anti-political position. Whatever the true nature of the Constitution may be, “no one has ever denied that the Supreme Court now construes the Constitution in a pro-slavery sense.”

This, then, is the law of the land until altered. Here again the position of the American Anti-Slavery Society is untouched. For whatever be the real character of the Constitution, if those who now swear to support that instrument are bound to support it in the sense which the Courts give it, then, surely, no Abolitionist can consistently take such an oath or ask another person to do so.

Lysander Spooner also had a position that enabled him to do an end run around the constitutionality controversy. Even if the Constitution is proslavery, it does not follow that judges who have sworn to enforce the provisions of that document are morally obligated to do so. This is because no oath to commit an injustice is ever valid. Spooner provided a number of examples to illustrate his argument, including this one.

Suppose A put a sword into the hands of B, on the condition of B’s taking an oath that with it he will murder C. Now, however immoral the taking of this oath may be, yet, when taken, the oath and the condition are utterly void. They are incapable of raising the least moral obligation, of any kind whatever, on the part of B towards A. B then holds the sword on the same principle, and by the same right, that he would have done if it had been put into his hands without any oath or condition whatever. Now the question is whether B, on refusing to fulfill the condition, is bound to retain the sword, and use it, if necessary, in defence of C? or whether he is bound to return it to A, in order that A may give it to some one who will use it for the murder of C? The case seems to be clear. If he were to give up the sword, under these circumstances, knowing the use that was intended to be made of it, and it should then be used, by some other person, for the murder of C, he would be, on both moral and legal principles, as much accessary to the murder of C, as though he had furnished the sword for that specific purpose, under any other circumstances whatever.

In Part Second of The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Spooner applied this reasoning to the argument of Phillips and other abolitionists who maintained that a judge who cannot in good conscience enforce an unjust law should resign his office. No, said Spooner. No judge is morally obligated to enforce an unjust law regardless of any oath he may have taken previously.

It being admitted that a judge can rightfully administer injustice as law, in no case, and on no pretence whatever; that he has no right to assume such an oath to do so; and that all oaths of that kind are morally void; the question arises, whether a judge, who has actually sworn to support an unjust constitution, be morally bound to resign his seat? or whether he may rightfully retain his office administering justice, instead of injustice, regardless of his oath?

Many “high authorities,” Spooner conceded, maintained that a judge ought to resign rather than enforce a law he regards as unjust, but Spooner disagreed. A judge ought to retain his seat and rule in favor of justice, regardless of what the letter of the law may say. No oath to uphold the rule of law is thereby violated because no oath to enforce unjust laws can possibly be valid and binding. The judge has only one obligation, namely, to enforce the natural law of justice regardless of what the edicts of a government may say. Drawing upon the principle previously explained, Spooner wrote:

The case appears to be this: The office [of judge] is simply power, put into a man’s hands, on the condition, based upon his oath, that he will use that power to the destruction or injury of some person’s rights. This condition, it is agreed, is void. He holds the power, then, by the same right that he would have done if it had been put into his hands without the condition. Now, seeing that he cannot fulfill, and is under no obligation to fulfill, this void condition, the question is, whether he bound to resign the power, in order that it may be given to some one who will fulfill the condition? or whether he is bound to hold the power, not only for the purpose of using it himself in defence of justice, but also for the purpose of withholding it from the hands of those who, if he surrender it to them, will use it unjustly? Is it not clear that he is bound to retain it for both of these reasons?

Phillips regarded Spooner’s argument—according to which a judge should ignore an unjust law and rule in favor of justice regardless of what the law demands, rather than resign his position when confronted with an unjust law (the standard position of most abolitionists)—as the most important practical implication of The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. This was the argument that Phillips primarily had in mind when he maintained (in a passage quoted above) that Spooner’s principles are “subversive of all sound principles of Government and of public faith” and would bring abolitionism in disrepute among Americans. For if judges are bound by nothing more than their own consciences, if they may render judgments based on their own ideas of justice regardless of what the law says, then there can never exist a stable rule of law. Indeed, Spooner’s position, if consistently applied, would lead to anarchy—a society in which no judge or other government official is bound to enforce the law of the land, whether just or unjust. The supposition that no judge is morally bound by his oath of office would make all government “impossible.” As Phillips put it:

Indeed, Mr. Spooner’s idea is practical no-governmentalism. It leaves every one to do “what is right in his own eyes.” After all, Messrs. Goodell and Spooner, with the few who borrow this idea of them, are the real no-government men; and it is singular, how much more consistent and sound are the notions of Non-resistants on this point [i.e., the views of William Lloyd Garrison and his followers],—the men who are generally considered, though erroneously, to be no-government men.

This is part of a series

The Jewish Onslaught

The Jewish Onslaught is a book by Dr. Tony Martin, a Caribbean black and Black Studies Tenured Professor at Wellesley College, now deceased, who had challenged the Jewish power structure. He tells his story of how the Jews tried to suppress his teachings of the blacks and Jewish relationship going back to the financial controls of the Atlantic slave trade to their involvement in manipulating the 1960s civil rights movement.

Both the controls of media and Hollywood is exposed as well as the concentration of wealth in N. American Jewry.

A talk by Martin at a small club on his book:

His book listing: